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WHY DIALOGUE? 
B EGIN by considering the role of dialogue in the life of a 
morally reflective person-a person, that is, who seriously 
asks himself how he should live and tries to live his life ac- 
cording to the answers he finds most plausible. How does talking 
enter into this exercise in self-definition? 
Well, it all depends. Surely Socrates's response remains relevant: 
compared to the question of the good life, do not all others pale by 
comparison? And how better to discover the truth than to engage in 
discussion with anyone and everyone who professes an answer? 
And yet I cannot allow Socrates to monopolize my moral vision. 
His fixation upon his single question threatens to distort the shape of 
human life-when will I get on with life itself if I am forever hung up 
on the question of how I ought to live? This is not to say that I should 
close myself off from moral questioning after adolescence; only that 
I must walk a tightrope, taking irreversible steps in the moral twilight 
while retaining the courage to stop and pause later on to peer among 
the shadows-at the risk of learning that my earlier decisions were 
worthless or worse. 
This reflection leads to second thoughts about the happy image of 
Socrates roaming the forum in search of the next know-it-all who 
might be snared into serious conversation. If answering Socrates's 
question does not amount to the whole of my life, I shall have to be 
far more selective about my conversation partners. I shall have to 
listen hard when others tell me that one book is a waste of time, 
another worth reading; this person a fool, another worth talking to. 
The need for extreme selectivity engenders, in turn, doubts about 
the value of the dialogues I actually do conduct. Perhaps there is 
some Socrates out there who would, if I only spent more time 
searching for him, help me discover the absurdities in the plausible- 
sounding-stuff-I am-listening-to? 
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Such anxieties may lead to the exploration of two very different 
paths-both of which lead away from a dialogic view of ethics. One 
path leads to the question of faith: Given the fragmentary character 
of the real-world dialogues I conduct, the real question is whom 
should I trust in helping me pick appropriate talking partners- 
which church or school or tradition? 
But I need not ask myself this question. Instead of appealing to 
external authority, I may appeal to myself. "Bruce, don't be too 
impressed with what Kant said, or your Aunt Selma for that matter. 
You will have to think for yourself. Talking to others is no substitute. 
Admittedly, your own moral insight isn't much to write home about; 
but, in the end, it's all you've got." 
For all its hubristic dangers, I subscribe to this individualistic view. 
For the present, though, I am not interested in defending individual- 
ism against the partisans of authority. Instead, I want to emphasize 
an aspect of moral phenomenology which both sides recognize. As a 
real-world matter, neither side supposes that talking to others is of 
supreme importance in moral self-definition. The key decisions are 
made in silence: Whom to trust? What do I really think? Although 
talking to others can be useful in thinking things through, a little talk 
may go a long way; a lot may lead nowhere. The moral value of my life 
does not merely depend on how I rationalize it in conversation, but 
upon the intrinsic value of my moral beliefs, and my success in living 
up to them. Thus, I do not really think less of somebody who refuses 
the offer of some would-be Socrates: "Stop bothering me, Socrates, 
I've better things to do with my time than blab with you." Such a 
response may well be a symptom of some deeper spiritual disease; 
but it may merely serve as a marker for the mature recognition that 
there is more to the moral life than mere talk. 
All this gives me a real problem when I turn from personal moral- 
ity to public life. Here I want to reverse field and proclaim dialogue 
as the first obligation of citizenship. Although a morally reflective 
person can permissibly cut herself off from real-world dialogue, a 
responsible citizen cannot with similar propriety cut herself off from 
political dialogue. 
My task is not merely to suggest why this is so, but to confront the 
asymmetry problem: to explain why dialogue seems so much more 
fundamental in public than in personal life. 
I. 
But perhaps I am making problems for myself? Perhaps there is no 
fundamental asymmetry between the status of dialogue in public and 
personal life? 
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One way to reestablish symmetry, of course, is to demote political 
dialogue and deny that it is any more exigent than talk in other 
domains. A second way is to reassert the ultimately dialogic character 
of all morality-personal as well as public. I shall start by considering 
this second, more positive, way of reestablishing symmetry: if, de- 
spite appearances, dialogue is more generally important to morality 
than I have supposed, then maybe I am wrong in thinking I must 
solve the asymmetry problem to redeem a dialogic view of politi- 
cal life? 
To take this line, it is not necessary to ignore the moral phenome- 
nology with which we began. One need only deprive it of founda- 
tional importance. Sure, each of us may appropriately shut himself 
off from moral dialogue on countless occasions in personal life. But 
real-world exigencies should not blind us to the regulatory role of an 
ideal speech situation in our search for moral enlightenment. De- 
spite our excusable failure to live up to the discursive ideal, we 
nevertheless suppose that we should be prepared to justify our moral 
choices if we ever found ourselves in an ideal dialogue with Socrates, 
Freud, and whomever-else-might-be-around-at-the-time. Indeed, we 
implicitly claim as much whenever we try to justify our life to our- 
selves (or others). To wax ontological: moral truth just is the name we 
give to those conclusions which would be reached in an ideal speech 
situation; nothing more and nothing less.' 
This, transparently, is quite a mouthful; and I am skeptical about 
its ultimate validity. For the present, though, it is not necessary to 
explore these doubts with you. Even if we ultimately came to endorse 
the dialogic ideal of morality, I do not think we will do so in a way 
that reestablishes symmetry with the dialogic responsibilities of pub- 
lic life. To explain why, I must emphasize that I am not interested in 
emphasizing the role of talk in some ideal world we shall never 
inhabit. I am talking about the very imperfect world in which we live. 
So long, then, as the partisan of the ideal speech situation excuses 
the real-world evasion of dialogue when people confront the moral 
dilemmas of personal life, he is still left with a troublesome asym- 
metry: Why does a dialogic ideal that allows such easy escape by 
' This theme has been developed at great length, and from different angles, by 
Jiirgen Habermas throughout his career. Compare his Knowledge and Human 
Interests, Jeremy J. Shapiro, trans. (Boston: Beaccn, 1971) with Legitimation 
Crisis, Thomas A. McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1975) with The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Thomas A. McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon, vol. 1: 1984; 
vol. II: 1987). 
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real-world people in personal life not allow such an easy escape when 
these very same people confront the dilemmas of public life? 
This is, I think, quite a hard question to answer-so long, at least, 
as we continue to look upon dialogue as a tool for the discovery of 
moral truth. For the world of practical politics does not seem at all 
close to anybody's idea of an ideal speech situation. Politicians do 
talk a lot, but it is not unduly cynical to suppose that they mean less of 
what they say than other folk. Thus, if I were trying to carve out a 
limited area of practical life where I had an especially strong obliga- 
tion to participate in the dialogic search for moral truth, politics 
seems an unlikely place to start. However imperfect a philosophy 
classroom or church discussion group or psychoanalytic office may 
seem in comparison with the ideal speech situation, surely they are 
better bets than the public forum? If we do not think we are morally 
required to talk in one or another of these more private places, why 
should the search for moral truth require us to take talk seriously in 
politics? 
The Athenians killed Socrates after all; and the modern state has 
hardly been more hospitable to the spirit of moral philosophy. 
II. 
Such reflections naturally lead me to question the asymmetry thesis 
from the other side. If practical political life seems such an unlikely 
forum for the dialogic search for moral truth, why insist that dia- 
logue is especially central to politics? 
Because there are other important things to talk about than the 
moral truth: in particular, how people who disagree about the moral 
truth might nonetheless reasonably solve their ongoing problem of 
living together. This is, at any rate, how liberals characteristically 
formulate the problem of political order;2 and it is from this vantage 
point that I wish to vindicate the asymmetry thesis. That is, I do not 
propose to base my case for public dialogue on some assertedly 
general feature of the moral life, but upon the distinctive way liberals 
conceive of the problem of public order. This means, of course, that 
my argument will not convince people who reject the underlying 
liberal problematic. The most I can do here is to set up the problem 
in a way that makes rejection difficult. 
2 Compare T. M. Scanlon, "Contractarianism and Utilitarianism," in Amartya 
Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (New York: Cam- 
bridge, 1982), pp. 103-128, esp. pp. 110-119; Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and 
Political Legitimacy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, XVI, 3 (Summer 1987): 
215-240. 
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Consider then a simple model of a liberal polity, consisting of N 
primary groups. Each primary group consists of one or more people 
who have combined faith and reason in an effort to search out the 
moral truth. Members of the same primary group have come up with 
the same answer to Socrates's question; members of different 
groups, different answers. Despite their ongoing disagreements, all 
groups find themselves on the same planet, in potential conflict over 
the planet's scarce resources. Hence the problem of liberal politics: 
How are the different groups to resolve their problem of mutual 
coexistence in a reasonable way? 
Assume the position of P, a morally reflective member of one or 
another primary group, and you can begin to see why dialogue seems 
especially important for the successful solution of this problem. 
After all, if P could be confident that people outside her group, the 
not-Ps, had reached the same conclusions as she did in their search 
for moral truth, then talking to them about the problem of coexis- 
tence might not be so important. Instead, each individual group 
could unilaterally declare its moral truths "to be self-evident" and 
authorize governmental officials to resolve all conflicts by consulting 
these self-evident truths. Since, on this hypothesis, each group's 
truths are identical to the others, there would be no need for the 
groups to talk to one another in order to come to terms about the 
aims of legitimate government. It is, however, precisely because P 
has reason to know that the not-Ps have not reached the same moral 
conclusions that talk seems especially exigent. Whereas there may 
only be one moral truth, there are surely an infinite number of paths 
to moral error. Precisely because P believes that she has got closest to 
the truth, all she knows about the not-Ps is that each has taken one 
of an infinite number of wrong turns on the path to truth. But which 
wrong turn? 
The answer will be critical in the solution of the liberal problem of 
coexistence. Perhaps the moral "errors" of the not-Ps will prove so 
serious to P that she will be unable to work out reasonable terms of 
coexistence with her fellow earthlings; but perhaps not. It all de- 
pends upon the particular moral mistakes made by the not-Ps and 
how these "errors" relate to the disputes that P and the not-Ps must 
resolve before they can live together on the same planet. There is, 
moreover, only one way for P to find out how matters stand. And 
that is to talk to the not-Ps about it. 
In undertaking this exercise in liberal conversation, P is not to try 
to convince the not-Ps to change their minds and see, at long last, 
the compelling truth of P. Instead, the conversation has a more 
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pragmatic intention. It recognizes that, for the moment at least, 
neither P nor not-P is going to win the moral argument to the 
other's satisfaction, and proceeds to consider the way they might live 
together despite this ongoing disagreement. P's refusal to talk to the 
not-Ps about this pragmatic question simply disqualifies her from 
the liberal project. She cannot think of herself as a participant in a 
liberal state unless she is willing to participate (in one way or an- 
other) in this ongoing conversation with the not-Ps. In contrast, P 
can think of herself as a participant in the search for moral truth 
without ever talking about this subject to the not-Ps (or to her fellow 
Ps for that matter). 
It is this simple difference which motivates the asymmetry thesis: 
the liberal citizen must recognize a dialogic obligation of a categori- 
cally different, and more imperative, kind than he does in his per- 
sonal pursuit of the moral truth. To put my point paradoxically, it is 
precisely because the liberal state does not aim for moral truth that 
its citizens must recognize themselves under such peremptory dialo- 
gic obligations. Let us call this the supreme pragmatic imperative: If 
you and I disagree about the moral truth, the only way we stand half 
a chance of solving our problems in coexistence in a way both of us 
find reasonable is by talking to one another about them. 
III. 
But is the pragmatic imperative really supreme? Granted, dialogue 
may be one way of reasonably solving the liberal's problem of coex- 
istence; but is it the only way? If not, why should we prefer dialogue 
over its competitors? 
These questions motivate the centuries-long liberal fascination 
with the marketplace as an alternative to more dialogic forms of 
dispute resolution. Here I am, needing some bricks to complete my 
cathedral; there you are, needing some beer to complete a wonderful 
Sunday afternoon at the football game. Do we really have to talk to 
one another to resolve our problem in mutual coexistence? Why do I 
not just trade some of my beer for some of your bricks at a mutually 
satisfactory rate of exchange? Why is trading not a perfectly reason- 
able way of side-stepping our moral disagreement over the relative 
merits of our Sunday activities? What does dialogue have to do 
with it? 
My answer is that dialogue has a lot to do with it, and it is ques- 
tion-begging to pretend otherwise. The point is hardly novel, but 
bears repeating, given the ease with which modern philosophical 
marketeers manage to evade it. It is the old question of meum and 
tuum. Of course, once I agree that those bricks over there are right- 
fully called "yours," and you agree that this beer over here is right- 
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fully "mine," we may then side-step our moral disagreements by 
trading away to our hearts' content.3 But why does the marketeer 
suppose that both of us are so ready to indulge his complacent 
assumptions? After all, the question of distributive justice has not 
just arisen in the history of Western civilization. 
Moreover, something special happens to the marketeer's preten- 
sions to sweet reasonableness once I respond to his eager offer to sell 
me some bricks for my cathedral by denying that the bricks are 
rightfully his to sell in the first place. As I move toward the bricks 
with appropriative intent, our marketeer has but two choices. One is 
to use brute force to repel my assertion of superior right; the other is 
to engage me in a conversation that seeks to persuade me that, 
despite our disagreement over the ultimate value of cathedrals and 
football stadiums, it is reasonable for me to recognize the legitimacy 
of his superior claim to the bricks. In making this claim, the "brick- 
owner" may try to link up his assertion of right to the liberal virtues 
of a market system. Moreover, depending on the existing distribu- 
tion of property rights, he might well convince me. 
But this in no way defeats my point. We are not now trying to 
locate the place of the market within a discursive theory of political 
justification. We are considering whether market forms of coordina- 
tion can plausibly allow liberals to deny dialogue the fundamental 
place accorded it by the supreme pragmatic imperative. The answer 
is "no" so long as the marketeer is prepared to concede that we may 
appropriately question each others' entitlements to the bargaining 
chips we bring to the bargaining table. 
This seems worth emphasizing at a time when some of the best 
known free-market tracts ostentatiously fail to satisfy the pragmatic 
imperative's demand for dialogic legitimation. Robert Nozick, for 
example, does not deny that a satisfactory defense of market rela- 
tions requires a theory of justice which defines the conditions under 
which one person might rightfully appropriate something his com- 
petitors also desire. Remarkably enough, he does not even try to 
come up with such a theory in his well-known Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia,4 charmingly suggesting that it would be a mistake to hold off 
publication until perfection were reached (ibid., pp. xiii-xiv). 
Perhaps this was good enough for a young man writing in the early 
1970s; fifteen years later, I begin to grow suspicious about his con- 
tinuing silence: Does Nozick simply suppose the question of distri- 
butive justice will go away because he refuses to answer it? Why 
3 So long, at least, as our trades do not adversely affect others (a big proviso). 
4 New York: Basic Books, 1974, cf. p. 150. 
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should others take his defense of markets seriously when he does not 
even try to answer the most obvious question about them?5 
IV. 
But how to discharge the dialogic burden of liberalism? How to talk 
to people who disagree with you about the moral truth? One thing is 
clear. Somehow or other, citizens of a liberal state must learn to talk 
to one another in a way that enables each of them to avoid con- 
demning their own personal morality as evil or false. Otherwise, the 
conversation's pragmatic point becomes pointless. 
This has hardly been lost upon the great spokesmen for the liberal 
tradition from Hobbes to the present. Indeed, the history of liberal 
thought can be read as a series of efforts to provide conversational 
models that would enable political participants to talk to one another 
in an appropriately neutral way. Rather than sustain self-confident 
liberal dialogue, however, these efforts have helped generate wide- 
spread skepticism about the conceptual possibility of neutrality. This 
skepticism poses an even greater threat to the pragmatic imperative 
5 Among modern free marketeers, only Friedrich Hayek has sought to challenge 
the supreme pragmatic imperative outright. Unlike Nozick, Hayek does not merely 
fail to answer the question of initial entitlements; he tries to cure us of the Enlight- 
enment disease that leads us to think the question is worth asking. Against the 
Enlightenment, Hayek emphasizes the pathetically limited capacity of individuals to 
understand their environment. On his view, men and women simply are not built to 
make the kinds of global judgments about social conditions of the kind propounded 
by theorists of distributive justice, liberal or otherwise. Instead of such blundering 
efforts "to correct" the market, the thoughtful person should stand in awed appre- 
ciation of the way markets allow imperfect humans to exchange far more informa- 
tion than any one of them could possibly process on his own. Rather than destroy 
this delicate evolutionary organism, we should root out the Enlightenment fantasy 
that men and women could, through public dialogue, improve upon the invisible 
hand of the market. This hubristic conversation about social justice will only em- 
power remote bureaucrats to aggrandize themselves at everybody's expense. So let 
us just stop asking the question of justice, and limit ourselves to bargaining with 
whatever bargaining chips the market is gracious enough to give us. See Hayek, 
Law, Legislation, and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University 
Press, 1976), esp. pp. 62-101. 
I am thoroughly unconvinced by Hayek's critique. Not that I wish to minimize the 
importance of markets. They are a key tool by which people with radically different 
ideals may coordinate their activities to mutual advantage. It is only Hayek's effort 
to treat the market as some quasi-divine adaptation to the human condition that I 
find mystifying. Rather than an organic development, the modern market system is 
the product of an unending series of highly self-conscious decisions by politicians, 
lawyers, policemen. Despite their mental limitations, most people are perfectly 
aware of this, and are quite capable of considering whether the market might 
operate more fairly if the relevant politicians, lawyers, policemen were given rather 
different operating instructions. The point of this footnote, however, is hardly to 
deal with Hayek's arguments with the care they deserve, but to point out that they 
proceed on a level that is more fundamental than most. 
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than does a question-begging faith in the market. Whatever reasons 
Kant may have had for his great maxim, surely liberal pragmatists will 
not question the wisdom of "Ought implies can." If we cannot find a 
way to talk to one another neutrally, we do not seem to have much 
choice but to give up on the pragmatic imperative and return to the 
age-old effort to base political life on the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth about the moral life. 
To make matters grimmer, I can hardly deny that the history of 
liberal thought gives substance to this skeptical suggestion. Although 
many have sought to blaze a path to neutrality, the goal has proven 
disturbingly elusive. Given centuries of failure, perhaps I am naively 
optimistic to suppose that we should continue the quest. Naive or 
not, this is what I do suppose. Simple prudence, however, suggests 
the wisdom of studying the mistakes of the past before trying to 
formulate a more defensible conception of a worthwhile neutrality. 
Although I can hardly present a comprehensive catalog of liberal 
error, it will be useful to isolate three recurring false moves before 
trying to break out of the impasse. 
The first false move tries to isolate a single value that all people 
consider most important despite their transparent disagreements 
over other values. By focusing upon the political implications of this 
supreme value, perhaps all of us may talk our way to a solution to our 
problems of coexistence in a way that we all find reasonable? 
For this conversational maneuver to succeed, all groups must 
identify the same value as supreme. The most promising candidate, 
as Hobbes saw early on, is the fear of death. What is equally clear, to 
me at least, is that neither the fear of death nor anything else has the 
moral resolving power Hobbes hoped for it. As a sometime resident 
of New York City, I have cultivated a healthy appreciation of life's 
evanescent quality. Yet I am happy to report that I have not pro- 
moted self-preservation to the supreme place in my moral scheme. 
Indeed, I would despise a person who was not willing to sacrifice his 
life for more important things on suitable occasions. Thus, I would 
refuse to participate in a political conversation that began: "How- 
ever much you and I disagree on other matters, we both accept the 
supreme importance of self-preservation." Rather than provide me 
with a neutral starting point, a Hobbesian political conversation 
would constantly oblige me to say things I found morally demeaning, 
despicable, false. If the point of liberal conversation is to enable me 
to talk to you without affirming moral propositions I think are false, 
the Hobbesian line goes nowhere. 
So does a second well-worn path to neutrality. Here I am not 
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called upon to affirm the existence of a single supreme value that 
trumps all our lesser moral disagreements. Instead, I am invited to 
translate my disagreements into a specially sanitized evaluative 
framework that promises to purge them of their non-neutral aspect. 
The classic example is Jeremy Bentham's felicific calculus, based on 
the neutral-seeming principle that "pushpin is as good as poetry." 
Once citizens of a Benthamite polity learn to translate their disputes 
into the common denominator of utility, they are promised a dis- 
course that will enable them to discuss their conflicts in a technocra- 
tic way that requires none of them to say anything inconsistent with 
their primary moral beliefs. 
The trouble comes, however, when we inquire about the manual 
that assesses the value of each human activity in terms of its "utility." 
My point is not the "standard" epistemological objection-whatever 
it may be-to interpersonal comparisons of utility. Of course, if it 
proves impossible to make interpersonal comparisons, the utilitarian 
can hardly make good on his promised translation manual, and we 
have reached a dead end very quickly. Since I believe that this objec- 
tion is overblown,' I do not want to rest my case against the transla- 
tion strategy on epistemological grounds. Instead, I shall suppose 
that my utilitarian has emerged triumphant over his epistemological 
critics, producing a manual that plausibly compares the "utility" 
produced by pushpin, poetry, and much more besides. 
It is at this stage that I want to enter my neutrality objection. 
However much one might admire the manual as a work in techno- 
cratic translation, it is quite another thing for the utilitarian to insist 
that his sanitized language must be used by the rest of us in talking 
about our political problems. Instead, his demand that all of us use 
his manual will provoke the very kind of un-neutral dialogue that he 
wished to avoid in the first place: Why does my desire for pushpin 
merit two utility points while your desire for poetry merits four? If 
this is what utility means, I refuse to speak a political language that 
obliges me to falsify my primary moral beliefs in such a systematic 
fashion! 
So much, then, for two wrong turns down the path toward neutral- 
ity. Let us consolidate our ground by calling one the trumping strat- 
egy: here the liberal seeks to trump primary moral disagreement by 
positing a supreme moral value we all putatively share as the basis for 
6 For some of the reasons suggested by Donald Davidson in "Judging Interper- 
sonal Interests," in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social 
Choice Theory (New York: Cambridge, 1986), pp. 195-21 1. 
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neutral political dialogue. Call the second the translation strategy: 
here we are invited to translate our moral categories into some alleg- 
edly uncontroversial framework of political assessment. Since nei- 
ther strategy looks at all promising, we can now give the skeptic's 
question about neutrality a sharper edge: Is there a liberal way of 
responding to primary moral disagreement without trying to trump 
it or to translate it? 
V. 
Well, I suppose we can try to transcend it. Thus Rawls, especially in 
his Kantian phase, seemed7 to be inviting us to gain perspective on 
our primary moral disagreements by trying to strip away all the 
particular life experiences that make them seem so important to us. 
If we might only think our way to the astonishing ignorance of the 
inhabitants of the "Original Position," perhaps we could solve our 
problems in political coexistence by talking to one another in a neu- 
tral way? 
Rawls's proposal is only the last in a long line of liberal exercises in 
transcendence. Many a utilitarian, for example, has urged us onward 
and upward to a perspective that, when compared to Rawls's, seems 
downright attractive. At least we are not obliged to think of ourselves 
as ignorant ciphers whose principal slogan is "more-for-me"; we are 
instead to talk to one another as if we were knowledgeable and 
benevolent ideal observers8 of the ongoing political struggle, con- 
cerned only to maximize the group's welfare. The formidable differ- 
ences between ignorant contractor and benevolent observer should 
not, however, blind us to a basic flaw they have in common. Partisans 
of both modes of transcendence seek to charge us an admission 
ticket, as it were, before we may participate in political conversation. 
We can only join the dialogue if we can manage to speak in the 
accents of the approved transcendent being without falsifying our 
primary moral commitments. If this is the price of admission, it is 
perfectly reasonable to refuse to pay it: "You so-called liberals say 
you'll only allow me to participate in political dialogue if I address 
our mutual problems from the vantage point of your favorite tran- 
7Despite Rawls's subsequent disavowal of this interpretation, ["Justice as Fair- 
ness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiv, 3 (Summer 
1985): 223-51], I do not believe that critics were simply engaged in tea-leaf reading 
in finding this theme (uneasily coexisting with many others) in Rawls's major works. 
See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (New York: Cambridge, 
1982). 
8 See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, xii, 3 (March 1952): 317-345. 
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scendent being. But it is precisely this affirmation of your recipe for 
transcendence that I find morally objectionable." 
Since Rawls's construction now dominates liberal thought, this 
complaint currently takes the form of eloquent attacks on the dera- 
cinating conception of the self presupposed by his thought experi- 
ment. A generation ago, when liberals took ideal observing more 
seriously, the complaint had to do with the extraordinary kind of 
self-immolation required in thinking myself into a position where 
the personal involvements of Bruce Ackerman counted no more (if 
no less) than those of Joe Shmoe.9 Although I am sympathetic to 
these particular complaints, it is more important to generalize them. 
The root of the problem is the wrongfulness involved in requiring 
citizens to affirm the value of any particular exercise in transcen- 
dence as a necessary condition for discursive participation. Any such 
demand will predictably require some citizens to talk about them- 
selves in morally demeaning and falsifying ways; and it is precisely 
this demand that makes the pragmatic imperative pointless. Trying to 
transcend our moral disagreements seems, in short, no more promis- 
ing than translating or trumping them. Once again, we have reached 
an impasse: Is there a way out? 
VI. 
Yes, I think there is. It is the path of conversational restraint. The 
basic idea is very simple. When you and I learn that we disagree 
about one or another dimension of the moral truth, we should not 
search for some common value that will trump this disagreement; 
nor should we try to translate it into some putatively neutral frame- 
work; nor should we seek to transcend it by talking about how some 
unearthly creature might resolve it. We should simply say nothing at 
all about this disagreement and put the moral ideals that divide us 
off the conversational agenda of the liberal state. In restraining 
ourselves in this way, we need not lose the chance to talk to one 
another about our deepest moral disagreements in countless other, 
more private, contexts. We simply recognize that, while these on- 
going debates continue, we will gain nothing of value by falsely as- 
serting that the political community is of one mind on deeply con- 
tested matters. Doubtless the exercise of conversational restraint will 
prove extremely frustrating-for it will prevent each of us from 
9 The development of this line of criticism over the last generation can be usefully 
approached through the work of Bernard Williams. Compare his Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard, 1985) with J. J. C. Smart & Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973), pp. 
77-155. 
WHY DIALOGUE? 17 
justifying our political actions by appealing to many of the things we 
hold to be among the deepest and most revealing truths known to 
humanity. Nonetheless, our mutual act of conversational restraint 
allows all of us to win a priceless advantage: none of us will be obliged 
to say something in liberal conversation that seems affirmatively 
false. Having constrained the conversation in this way, we may in- 
stead use dialogue for pragmatically productive purposes: to identify 
normative premises all political participants find reasonable (or, at 
least, not unreasonable). 
To refine this simple idea, begin by clarifying its intended domain 
of application. In calling for conversational constraint, I am not 
trying to stifle the voices of those who wish to challenge one or 
another aspect of their ongoing power relationship with others. To 
the contrary, a liberal polity must allow any person to raise any 
question she wants to if its dialogic project is to succeed: If the point 
of liberal politics is to come up with solutions that all participants 
find reasonable, how could this possibly be accomplished if citizens 
are not even allowed to place all their questions on the discursive 
agenda? 
My principle of conversational restraint does not apply to the 
questions citizens may ask, but to the answers they may legitimately 
give to each others' ouestions:'? whenever one citizen is confronted 
"' The simple distinction between questions and answers helps clarify a Rawlsian 
project with which I am very sympathetic. In his most recent work, Rawls is con- 
cerned to distinguish liberal political life from one that is based on a "mere modus 
vivendi." See John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Jour- 
nal of Legal Studies, VII, 1 (Spring 1987): 1-25, esp. pp. 10-15. For me, this 
dismissive label describes a regime that extends the principle of conversational 
restraint beyond its proper bounds to deny citizens the unrestricted right to insist 
on a liberal answer to any aspect of their power relationship which they wish to 
question by placing it on the political agenda. Consider, for example, a polity that 
threatens to punish anyone who tries to precipitate serious political debate about 
the existing distribution of property rights or gender roles. Although the political 
agenda is left open to questions on other matters, each person is told that she will 
simply have "to live with" the status quo so far as this particular dimension of power 
is concerned. Such a restriction on political freedom, to my mind, categorically 
deprives the regime of liberal legitimacy, and reduces it to the status of a "mere 
modus vivendi." 
I cannot deny, however, that a "mere modus vivendi" may be the best liberals can 
realistically hope for under one or another extreme set of conditions-where al- 
lowing the serious political consideration of the power that comes from property or 
whatever will tear the place apart, and lead only to the destruction of a polity that 
might otherwise have generated productive political dialogue on other issues. Even 
as a temporary expedient, however, the use of such "gag rules" is fraught with 
danger. Nonetheless, the world being the place that it is, I cannot say that such a 
drastic step is absolutely unthinkable. See Steven Holmes, "Gag Rules or the Politics 
of Omission," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democ- 
racy (New York: Cambridge, 1988), pp. 19-58. 
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by another's question, he cannot suppress the questioner, nor can he 
respond by appealing to (his understanding of) the moral truth; he 
must instead be prepared, in principle,"I to engage in a restrained 
dialogic effort to locate normative premises that both sides find 
reasonable. 
The substantive outcome of this liberal dialogue will, of course, 
depend upon our primary moral commitments. Nonetheless, we can 
say something pretty general about the formal relationship between 
liberal political conversation and the talk going on in other places in 
liberal society. To make the formal points simple, suppose that there 
were only two primary groups in our liberal society and that their 
efforts at constrained conversation have succeeded in isolating some 
common evaluative ground. The over-all shape of normative conver- 
sation, then, will look something like this: 
| ~~ ~ P1 L P2 
P, and P2 represent the set of moral propositions each primary 
group affirms in conversations between members of the same group. 
In intergroup conversation, however, participants only make use of 
the L-propositions for purposes of conflict resolution. For it is only 
these propositions which will not be condemned as false by members 
of either group (though the reasons P, and P2 will give to justify any 
particular L proposition may, of course, be quite different). 
While I hope you find this formalism clarifying, I should empha- 
" I Of course, practical steps must be taken to organize the agenda so as to make it 
manageable for real-world debate and decision. But this practical task cannot be 
made the pretext for the infinite deferral of a part of the agenda which some 
powerful participants do not wish to consider. See fn. 10. 
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size that it only describes the first, and more negative, stage of the 
liberal dialectic-the stage where liberal citizens, through the exer- 
cise of conversational restraint, identify L-propositions that might 
function as public value premises in a liberal political argument. 
Even if such a purging operation were completely carried out,12 it 
remains for the liberal citizenry to fashion affirmative arguments out 
of the available public premises-arguments sufficiently incisive to 
resolve the citizenry's ongoing disputes. Obviously, this affirmative 
operation can be a creative business. Depending on the L-set, there 
may be a host of discursive possibilities available. 
For present purposes, the important thing to notice is the distinc- 
tive character of these arguments. On the one hand, none of the 
participants condemns any of their normative premises as morally 
false; on the other hand, the argumentative aim is not to discover the 
ultimate moral truth. Instead, it is to provide each citizen with some- 
thing different-a way of reasonably responding to their continuing 
moral disagreement. As a consequence, the ongoing political dia- 
logue looks very different from the kinds of conversation idealized by 
critical theorists like Jiirgen Habermas. Most importantly, liberal 
citizens do not feel free to introduce any and all moral arguments 
into the conversational field. Instead of looking to ultimate conver- 
sational victory in some far-distant ideal speech situation, their ener- 
gies are focused on the formidable task of governing this world 
through a political dialogue that does not require participants to 
renounce publicly their deepest moral beliefs. However humble the 
liberal's dialogic ambitions may seem from the unreachable heights 
of the ideal speech situation, my principal aim has been to convince 
you that even such a limited dialogic objective is not necessarily an 
impossible dream; that you and I may strive to govern this world 
through dialogue, albeit dialogue of a special kind. 
VII. 
But, I hear you ask, is this fourth path toward neutrality really dif- 
ferent from the first three? Does not it too demand something from 
people which they may not be morally prepared to give? 
Yes, but the sacrifice is of a different kind. Rather than require 
people to say things they believe are false, I am asking them to make a 
special kind of emotional sacrifice. At least on those occasions when 
liberal citizens meet with one another to reason their way to legally 
authoritative resolutions of their disputes, each must try to repress 
their desire to say many things which they believe are true, but which 
12 In real life, there will usually be no practical need for a sharp separation of the 
two phases of the liberal dialectic described in this paragraph. 
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will divert the group's energy away from the elaboration of the prag- 
matic implications of the L-set. 
This kind of selective repression is, I think, a familiar feature of 
social life. It is continually required by the ongoing exercise that 
sociologists call role playing. Each social role can be understood as a 
set of conventional constraints upon acceptable symbolic behavior. 
When acting as a lawyer, I operate under constraints different from 
those delimiting my conduct as a teacher, which are different, in 
turn, from those involved in working on a construction project. 
Some role definitions allow for a broader range of symbolic behavior 
than others; but all roles are constraining, placing vast domains of 
conversation off the agenda so long as the participants are acting 
within a particular role framework."3 
Truth is not necessarily a defense for stepping out of role. Thus, 
when I go into a class on political philosophy, I must restrain any 
impulse I might have to talk about the calculus of variations-even 
though my remarks on the calculus may be truer than anything I have 
to offer about politics. To be a competent social actor, I must con- 
stantly engage in a process of selective repression-restraining the 
impulse to speak the truth on a vast number of role-irrelevant mat- 
ters so as to get on with the particular form of life in which I am 
presently engaged. Just as you and I try to stick to the point when we 
are building a car or worshipping god, so too liberal citizens must 
exercise a similar kind of self-control when engaging in liberal poli- 
tics-joining together neither to build a better Buick nor to save 
men's souls, but to solve the conflicts of social life on terms that all 
participants may find reasonable. Thus, in calling upon people to 
exercise conversational self-restraint in public life, I am asking them 
to exercise a fundamental competence that all socialized human 
beings possess (to one or another degree). 
But, of course, this is hardly enough to make my demand morally 
uncontroversial: the idea of conversational constraint is, at best, a 
part of a satisfactory political philosophy, not the whole of it. Most 
obviously, my proposal will be opposed by the partisans of an ethic of 
radical spontaneity, who look upon all roles as if they were merely 
fetters on the human spirit, and call upon us to smash any role as 
soon as we begin to perform it competently.'4 On this level, the 
13 For a brilliant analysis of this aspect of role relations, see Erving Goffman, 
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: Har- 
vard, 1974). 
14 Roberto Unger comes remarkably close to this position in his recent work. See 
his Passion (New York: Free Press, 1984); Social Theory: Its Situation and Its 
Task (New York: Cambridge, 1987); False Necessity (New York: Cambridge, 1987). 
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defense of the conversational restraints of liberal citizenship is sim- 
ply a special case of a more general affirmation of the value of role 
playing in social life. Such a defense need not deny the reality of 
spiritual constraint which the romantic critic finds so confining, nor 
the importance of working with others to create new role relations 
that better express the different aspects of our being. (Indeed, my 
proposal to develop more fully the role of liberal citizen falls pre- 
cisely under this second heading.) Instead, a defender of liberal role 
playing should argue that the romantic critic has chosen the wrong 
way to ease the sense of role constriction which threatens to strangle 
him. Rather than assault the very idea of role playing, it seems wiser 
to seek relief in the marvelous human capacity to shift role engage- 
ments over time. I can be a lawyer, teacher, construction worker, 
father, baseball coach-as well as a liberal citizen. Although each of 
these roles imposes its own constraints, the value of my life is hardly 
exhausted by the way I confront the challenges of any particular one; 
it depends as well on how I shift from role to role over time and build 
up a meaningful whole out of these temporally-limited parts. This 
seems a better response to the inadequacies of any individual role 
than a romantic effort to repudiate role playing entirely. 
Even if so much were conceded, the defense of liberal restraint 
must proceed to a second stage. After all, I am not arguing for any 
system of roles, but a system that gives the role of liberal citizenship a 
central place. What is so good about trying to solve disputes through 
a neutrally constrained dialogue? 
VIII. 
There are many ways to answer this question. Some will seek to 
elaborate the intrinsic virtues of liberal citizenship-the distinctive 
value of the liberal's relentless effort to weave a web of intelligibility 
which can link parties together despite their many moral differences 
from one another, the moral value of allowing all of us to participate 
in politics without falsifying our deepest convictions. Others will 
pursue more consequentialist paths-emphasizing the value of the 
open society that it is the aim of liberal citizenship to produce. 
My aim here, however, has not been to convince you of the ulti- 
mate value of liberal citizenship. It has been to suggest its distinctive 
character. I have tried to explain the liberal grounds for the dialogic 
imperative in politics, and defend this pragmatic imperative against 
two relatively obvious objections-one raised by the free-marketeer, 
the other by the neutrality skeptic. Although the question-begging 
character of the free-marketeer's objection is pretty obvious,'5 I have 
15 But recall my inadequate treatment of Hayek in fn. 5. 
22 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
only begun to take the skeptic seriously. At best, I have suggested 
why the admitted failures of the past need not discourage us from 
blazing a new trail toward the liberal state-one through which, by 
the resolute exercise of conversational restraint, you and I may talk 
to one another in ways that neither of us condemns as morally unrea- 
sonable. 
I have not even tried to establish affirmatively that the path of 
conversational restraint will not finally lead liberals to a fourth dead 
end. As you and I discover that we disagree about more and more 
things, perhaps we will find that the exercise of conversational re- 
straint leaves us nothing to say to one another about our basic prob- 
lems of coexistence. In terms of our simple Venn diagram, perhaps 
the L-set will turn out to be empty. This seems especially likely since 
the typical Western society contains many primary groups, whereas 
our simple picture only schematizes the L-set of a two-group society. 
As we increase the number of circles in our picture, the conversa- 
tional space described by the intersecting L-set will get progressively 
smaller and smaller. Under modern conditions, does it shrink 
to zero? 
This is the question I asked myself in Social Justice in the Liberal 
State.6 Rather than rehearse my own answer, it has seemed more 
important to encourage you to think the question worth asking-by 
cautioning you against a superficial diagnosis of the liberal aspira- 
tion. Liberalism does not depend upon a question-begging faith in 
markets. Nor need it demand an alienating form of self-presentation 
which requires us to repudiate publicly our deepest moral convic- 
tions. Instead, it calls upon us to reflect upon the pragmatic impera- 
tive to talk to strangers as well as soul-mates; and to consider 
whether, despite the strangers' strangeness, we might still have some- 
thing reasonable to say to one another about our efforts to coexist 
on this puzzling planet. 
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